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Carbon Pricing and the 1.5°C Target: Near-
Term Decarbonisation and the Importance of
an Instrument Mix
Michael Mehling and Endre Tvinnereim*
Carbon pricing is routinely presented as the most efficient way to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, and therefore as an indispensable pillar of ambitious climate policy. For incre-
mental emission reductions on the margin, this static perspective may be correct, express-
ing the ability of carbon pricing to identify and spur abatement options with the lowest cost.
At the same time, meeting the 1.5°C target requires achievement of zero net emissions in the
relatively near term, implying a need for full decarbonisation rather than marginal abate-
ment. To date, there is only limited empirical evidence suggesting that carbon pricing has
produced deep emission cuts. Emission reductions triggered by carbon taxes and emissions
trading systems are typically modest or relate to a baseline rather than absolute levels, even
in cases where price levels are relatively high. Consequently, we posit that deep decarboni-
sation in line with the 1.5°C target can only be ensured by drawing on a portfolio approach,
in which carbon pricing operates alongside other instruments including regulation and le-
gal mandates.
I. Carbon Pricing and its Hegemony in
the Climate Policy Debate
Economists almost unanimously recommend that
emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) pay a price for
every ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emit-
ted, and that such a price on carbon be the ‘logical
foundation of any policy regime’ to avert dangerous
anthropogenic climate change.1 A recent article, for
instance, argues that ‘among all instruments carbon
pricing deserves the most serious attention from re-
searchers, politicians, and citizens.’2 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, carbon pricing is being advanced in mul-
tiple venues as the single most important policy in-
strument to address climate change, dominating po-
litical debates and benefitting from substantial pub-
lic resources for stakeholder outreach, public diplo-
macy and capacity building.
Carbon pricing has been defined as ‘initiatives
that put an explicit price on greenhouse gas emis-
sions, ie, a price expressed as a value per ton of car-
bon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e)’,
3 and is commonly
implemented through a corrective price set political-
ly in the form of taxes, charges, and other levies,4 or
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1 On the ‘logical foundation’, see World Economic Forum (WEF),
Green Investing: Towards a Clean Energy Infrastructure (WEF
2009) 39; see also Nicholas H Stern, The Economics of Climate
Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press 2007);
Thomas Sterner, ‘Fuel Taxes: An Important Instrument for Climate
Policy’ [2007] 35 Energy Pol’y 3194; Joseph E Stiglitz and others,
Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices (World
Bank 2017).
2 Andrea Baranzini and others, ‘Carbon Pricing in Climate Policy:
Seven Reasons, Complementary Instruments, and Political Econo-
my Considerations’ [2017] 8 WIREs Clim Change 1, 13.
3 World Bank, Carbon Pricing Watch 2017 (World Bank 2017)
20.
4 William J Baumol, ‘On Taxation and the Control of Externalities’
[1972] 62 Am Econ Rev 307, drawing on Arthur C Pigou, The
Economics of Welfare (Macmillan & Co 1920).
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through quantity controls with a market for tradable
permits, in which the dynamic of supply and de-
mand reveals the price.5 Underlying the broad ap-
peal of this policy instrument is the observation that
different emission abatement options have different
costs, and that a price signal is the most efficient pol-
icy option because it relies on market forces to iden-
tify and trigger the abatement options with the low-
est cost. In an ideal state, this will level marginal
abatement costs across emitters in all sectors and ju-
risdictions.
In addition to this instrumental function, carbon
pricing also has an epistemic dimension, where it is
regularly used as a proxy for policy efforts in eco-
nomic modelling. Models used in climate and ener-
gy projections calculate the marginal costs of emis-
sion reductions, typically expressed as implicit car-
bon prices.6 A common starting point of global inte-
grated assessment models is a ‘ubiquitous price on
carbon and other GHGs’ in every country and sector,
which ‘rises over time in a way that minimizes the
discounted sum of costs over time’.7 Numerous mod-
el runs have been completed for numerous GHG con-
centration levels at various times. What these mod-
els express are the marginal costs of reducing the fi-
nal ton of CO2e at a given level of ambition, whether
that reduction be achieved through taxes, emission
caps, subsidies, direct regulations or any combina-
tion of these.
As the foregoing passages underscore, carbon
pricing plays a pervasive role in discourses on cli-
mate change, both as a prominent policy recommen-
dation and as an epistemic tool. Yet another mani-
festation of the concept relates to the optimal price
level: economists have long sought to calculate the
social cost of carbon, that is, the expected damage
arising from one additional ton of CO2e emitted.
8 As-
suming optimal carbon pricing and perfect market
conditions for emitters worldwide, a price on all
GHG emissions equalling the social cost of carbon
should theoretically result in an optimal emission
level: low enough to ensure the functioning of hu-
man society and ecosystems, but without curtailing
those emissions that contribute the highest value to
social welfare. Such estimates of the social cost of
carbon are widely used to support public policy de-
cision making through quantified assessment of the
benefits of climate mitigation efforts, and, more
specifically, to inform the design of carbon pricing
policies.9
II. Tensions between Carbon Pricing
and the 1.5°C Target
1. Welfare Maximisation vs. Politically
Agreed Targets
Already at a conceptual level, the compelling premise
of carbon pricing as an instrument to quantify the
environmental externalities of carbon emissions –
and internalise these into the economic cost of un-
derlying behaviour10 – reveals a tenuous correlation
with the politically agreed objective of deep decar-
bonisation within specified timelines. Even if we
knew the correct social cost of carbon, and had the
political support needed to implement a correspond-
ing pricing policy, we could still not guarantee glob-
al carbon neutrality during the second half of the cen-
tury as required by the Paris Agreement and many
national and subnational legislative or policy acts.
Nor would that carbon price necessarily ensure the
rapid and steep decarbonisation pathways called for
5 Thomas D Crocker, ‘The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution
Control Systems’ in Harold Wolozin (ed), The Economics of Air
Pollution: A Symposium (W W Norton, 1966) 61; John H Dales,
Pollution, Property & Prices: An Essay in Policymaking and Eco-
nomics (University of Toronto Press 1968); David W Montgomery,
‘Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs’
[1972] 5 J Econ Theory 395, drawing on Ronald H Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost [1960] 3 JLE 1.
6 Christoph Bertram and others, ‘Complementing Carbon Prices
with Technology Policies to Keep Climate Targets within Reach’
[2015] 5 Nat Clim Change 235; Massimo Tavoni and others,
‘Post-2020 Climate Agreements in the Major Economies Assessed
in the Light of Global Models’ [2015] 5 Nat Clim Change 119.
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change
2014: Mitigation of Climate Change (eds Ottmar Edenhofer and
others, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 449.
8 David Anthoff and Richard SJ Tol, ‘The Uncertainty about the
Social Cost of Carbon: A Decomposition Analysis Using FUND’
[2013] 117 Clim Change 515; William Pizer and others, ‘Using
and Improving the Social Cost of Carbon’ [2014] 346 Science
1189.
9 See the survey in Stephen Smith and Nils A Braathen, ‘Monetary
Carbon Values in Policy Appraisal: An Overview of Current
Practice and Key Issues’ (2015) OECD Environment Working
Papers No 92 <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/
5jrs8st3ngvh-en.pdf> accessed 8 March 2018.
10 Such externalities are described by economists as a market
failure, denoting an inefficient allocation of goods and services by
the market, see Francis M Bator, ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’
[1958] 72 Q J Econ 351. Internalising the social cost of pollution
in the private cost of underlying economic activity has been
proposed as one way to correct the market failure, see William J
Baumol and Wallace E Oates, The Theory of Environmental
Policy (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press 1988) 155.
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by climate science to achieve the 1.5°C objective: un-
der virtually all scenarios, net emission levels have
to reach zero during this century,11 requiring all or
close to all abatement options to be realised, includ-
ing those with higher cost.12
As long as the private benefit of emitting behav-
iour exceeds its (internalised) social cost, however,
rational economic actors will continue to emit. Since
present estimates of the social cost of carbon are rel-
atively low, pricing policies based on them will still
be eclipsed by the private benefit of many types of
emitting behaviour. That is not a flaw of the concept
as such, but a condition of its ability to maximise so-
cial welfare by guiding mitigation to activities where
the benefits of abatement outweigh its cost. It does,
however, show that the theoretical notion of a social
cost of carbon is not aligned with the political objec-
tive of full decarbonisation during this century, as
scientific uncertainties preclude establishing with
sufficient confidence that zero or negative emissions
are economically optimal.
Proponents will rightly counter that the social cost
of carbon is not static, and is expected to rise over
time.13 Some have also argued that the risk of cata-
strophic climate outcomes is insufficiently reflected
in present estimates, justifying considerably higher
values and a much steeper increase.14 Given such un-
certainties in calculating the accurate social cost of
carbon, some jurisdictions have altogether aban-
doned it as the primary metric for policy choices.15
Instead, they have opted to work backward from an
agreed emissions or temperature target to infer a car-
bon price consistent with a pathway towards target
achievement. Such an approach aligns well with as-
pirational or legally binding climate targets, and al-
so underpins the 1.5°C target contained in the Paris
Agreement.16 Rather than pursuing welfare maximi-
sation through Pareto efficient allocation of abate-
ment efforts, thus, this approach relies on political
negotiation, aligning scientific and economic consid-
erations with equity concerns and the preferences of
diverse constituencies.17
Working back from politically agreed targets leads
to carbon prices that are considerably higher than
mainstream estimates of the social cost of carbon, al-
beit again subject to uncertainty. Projections of the
carbon prices required to achieve the 2°C target, for
instance, range from USD 15 to 360 per tCO2e in
2030, USD 45 to 1,000 per tCO2e in 2050, and USD
750 to 8,300 per tCO2e in 2100.18 No comparable
analysis has yet been published for achievement of
the 1.5°C target, although an initial study of mitiga-
11 Joeri Rogelj and others, ‘Scenarios Towards Limiting Global Mean
Temperature Increase Below 1.5°C’, [2018] 10 Nat Clim Change
<doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0091-3> (online first); for the 2°C
target: Detlef P van Vuuren and others, ‘RCP2. 6: Exploring the
Possibility to Keep Global Mean Temperature Increase Below
2°C’ [2011] 109 Clim Change 95.
12 Asbjørn Torvanger and James Meadowcroft, ‘The Political Econo-
my of Technology Support: Making Decisions about Carbon
Capture and Storage and Low Carbon Energy Technologies’
[2011] 21 Global Envtl Change 303.
13 See, for instance, William D Nordhaus, A Question of Balance:
Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policy (Yale University
Press 2008).
14 Arguing that high-cost, low-probability events justify a consider-
ably higher social cost of carbon, see Robert B Litterman ‘What Is
the Right Price for Carbon Emissions?’ (2013) 36:2 Regulation 38;
more generally, Martin L Weitzman, ‘On Modeling and Interpret-
ing the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change’ [2009] 91
Rev Econ & Statistics 1. One influential effort to quantify the
social cost of carbon – developed by the U.S. Interagency Work-
ing Group on the Social Cost of Carbon – therefore included a
separate, higher value to capture the damages associated with
extreme climate outcomes, although the central estimate used for
policy making purposes remained in the much lower range found
in other mainstream estimates, see the 95th percentile value
(‘High Impact’) for the social cost of carbon in United States
Environmental Protection Agency, ‘The Social Cost of Carbon:
Estimating the Benefits of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions’
<https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social
-cost-carbon_.html> accessed 8 March 2018. Under the current
administration, the United States has abandoned use of the
social cost of carbon as a metric altogether.
15 Specifically, they point to the considerable uncertainties about
climate sensitivity and climate-induced damage functions, as well
as disagreement about the appropriate discount rate, see Robert S
Pindyck, ‘Pricing Carbon When We Don't Know the Right Price’
(2013) 36:2 Regulation 43, 44.
16 See, for instance, for the United Kingdom: Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC), ‘Carbon Valuation in UK Policy
Appraisal: A Revised Approach’ (2009) <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
245334/1_20090715105804_e
____carbonvaluationinukpolicyappraisal.pdf> accessed 8 March
2018; similarly, the European Union has moved away from
relying purely on the social cost of carbon for long-term climate
policy design, see Paul Watkiss, ‘The Social Costs of Carbon
(SCC) Review: Methodological Approaches for Using SCC Esti-
mates in Policy Assessment’ (2006) Final Report to Defra <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/243816/aeat-scc-report.pdf> accessed 8 March 2018.
17 Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows, ‘A New Paradigm for Climate
Change’ [2012] 2 Nat Clim Change 639.
18 In 2005 USD, respectively, based on scenarios that limit warming
to below 2°C with a greater than 66% probability, see Stiglitz and
others (n 1) 32, based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), Mitigation of Climate Change: Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press,
2014) 450.
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tion cost differential between 1.5°C and 2°C scenar-
ios suggests that, all else equal, carbon prices to
achieve the 1.5°C target need to be about 2 to 3 times
higher than in 2°C scenarios, and – because keeping
temperatures below 1.5°C requires much more rapid
decarbonisation of the economy – up to 5 times high-
er in the near term, by 2030.19 In other words, if car-
bon pricing is the only policy relied upon for decar-
bonisation in line with the 1.5°C target, price levels
would have to lie between USD 75 to 1800 per tCO2e
in 2030.
2. Political and Behavioural Constraints
Such high prices will unquestionably deliver sub-
stantial emission reductions. Outside the realm of
economic theory and modelling, however, it is doubt-
ful that carbon prices can ever achieve these levels.
Already at much lower levels, persistent challenges
related to the political economy of carbon pricing
have been documented across multiple jurisdictions,
leading commentators to write about ‘binding polit-
ical constraints’.20 Such constraints are highly conse-
quential, having thwarted the passage of many car-
bon pricing proposals21 or, in some cases, prompted
the repeal of carbon pricing systems already in
place.22 Unlike other climate policy instruments, car-
bon pricing makes the cost of compliance fully trans-
parent, and tends to impose it disproportionately on
a limited group of articulate, politically influential
emitters while spreading out a weakly benefit23 – the
incremental mitigation of climate change – among
many diffuse and poorly organized constituents.24
As such, therefore, carbon pricing epitomises a poli-
cy susceptible to regulatory capture and the failure
of collective action in the common interest.25 Where
higher carbon prices can be politically implemented,
however, they give rise to equity concerns, as poorer
households will be disproportionately impacted. Re-
distributive mechanisms can correct that, but further
complicate the politics around carbon pricing, and,
by extension, its elegant conceptual simplicity as a
policy instrument.
Even if carbon pricing at prescribed levels were po-
litically viable, increasing steeply in line with decar-
bonisation targets, or imposing a steadily declining
cap that signals future allowance scarcity, it would still
not automatically result in the emission reductions
projected by economic models. Behavioural econom-
ics and psychology are continuously improving our
understanding of human responses to different types
of policy incentives, and suggest that economic actors
are not only frequently irrational, but react to price
signals in complex and unpredictable ways.26 Eco-
nomic theory itself acknowledges that market failures
other than the externalities of pollution contribute to
climate change, including knowledge and adoption
spillovers, informational failures, myopia and bound-
ed rationality, time-inconsistencies, moral hazard, and
19 Joeri Rogelj et al, ‘Energy System Transformations for Limiting
End-of-Century Warming to Below 1.5 °C’ [2015] 5 Nat Clim
Change 519, 525.
20 Jesse D Jenkins and Valerie J Karplus, ‘Carbon Pricing Under
Political Constraints: Insights for Accelerating Clean Energy
Transitions’ in Douglas Arent and others (eds), The Political Econ-
omy of Clean Energy Transitions (Oxford University Press 2017)
39; Jesse D Jenkins, ‘Political Economy Constraints on Carbon
Pricing Policies: What Are the Implications for Economic Efficien-
cy, Environmental Efficacy, and Climate Policy Design?’ [2014]
69 Energy Pol’y 467.
21 Examples include a failed carbon and energy tax proposal in the
European Union during the 1990s, see Frank J Convery, ‘Origins
and Development of the EU ETS’ [2009] 43 Envtl Res Econ 391; a
United States federal tax on energy that also aimed to reduce
GHG emissions, see Dawn Erlandson, ‘The BTU Tax Experience:
What Happened and Why It Happened’ [1994] 12 Pace Envtl L
Rev 173; a Canadian federal carbon tax proposal in 2008, see
Kathryn Harrison, ‘A Tale of Two Taxes: The Fate of Environmental
Tax Reform in Canada’ [2012] 29 Rev Pol’y Res 383, 397; the
volatile evolution of subnational carbon pricing proposals in the
United States, see Barry G Rabe, ‘The Durability of Carbon Cap-
and-Trade Policy’ [2016] 29 Governance 103, and, most recently,
press coverage of the recurring defeat of carbon tax legislation in
Washington State.
22 Examples include the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism,
revoked in 2014 following a federal election, see Christopher
Rootes, ‘A Referendum on the Carbon Tax? The 2013 Australian
Election, the Greens, and the Environment’ [2014] 23 Envtl Pol
166, and the withdrawal of New Jersey from the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative in 2011.
23 Sander van der Linden, Edward W Maibach and Anthony A
Leiserowitz, ‘Improving Public Engagement with Climate Change:
Five “Best Practice” Insights from Psychological Science’ [2015]
10 Perspect Psychol Sci 758.
24 In the typology of public policies set out by Theodore J Lowi,
‘American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political
Theory’ [1964] 16 World Pol 677, this would reflect ‘regulation’.
Equity considerations and concern about the social impacts of
carbon pricing on disadvantaged or vulnerable groups tend to
prevent redistribution of the compliance burden away from large
emitters to the broader public.
25 Mancur L Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press 1965);
George J Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2:1
Bell J Econ Mgmt Sci 3.
26 Damien Bazin, Jerome Ballet and David Touahri, ‘Environmental
Responsibility versus Taxation’ [2004] 49 Ecol Econ 129.
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split incentives.27 Pricing is not ideally suited to cor-
rect such market failures, which tend to be behaviour-
al or institutional in nature, and which create barri-
ers to mitigation that a mere increase in the private
cost of emitting behaviour may not easily overcome.
3. Dynamic Efficiency and
Transformative Potential
Collectively, the foregoing observations about theo-
retical premises and political economy constraints of
carbon pricing contribute to yet another property
that affects its suitability as a driver of decarbonisa-
tion within strict timelines: its dynamic – rather than
static – efficiency.28 When it comes to static efficien-
cy, that is, the ability to prompt refinement of exist-
ing technologies, processes and capabilities, carbon
pricing is unrivalled in the way it channels abatement
to the options with least cost: by allowing flexibility
across space and time, it lets the market decide when
and where to mitigate, equalizing marginal abate-
ment cost across the economy in a Pareto-efficient
equilibrium.29
Its ability to foster dynamic efficiency, however,
and spur development of new technologies, process-
es, and capabilities is less clear.30 By design, carbon
pricing is meant to favour the most affordable emis-
sion reductions at any given point in time, rather
than spur early investment in research, development,
and deployment of advanced abatement technolo-
gies. As we progress towards full decarbonisation of
the economy, however, such mitigation options with
long lead times will successively be indispensable at
commercial scale. Carbon pricing, which targets the
negative externalities of emitting behaviour, is not
ideally suited to capture the positive externalities of
innovation, such as knowledge diffusion.31 Accord-
ingly, innovation levels under existing carbon pric-
ing systems have been modest at best.32
Another dynamic challenge relates to how carbon
pricing influences investment behaviour. In existing
carbon pricing systems, investors in emitting assets
and infrastructure have been shown to make myopic
choices that discount future compliance obligations
and imply scepticism33 about the durability of cli-
mate policies over the longer term.34 Because such
investments have a normal economic life of years or
even decades, they result in carbon lock-in and im-
pede decarbonisation of affected sectors.35 Already,
research has suggested that no new emitting electric-
ity infrastructure should be built if the 2°C threshold
is to be met,36 a hard constraint that would apply all
the more on a pathway towards 1.5°C. Only abandon-
ing such investments before the end of their useful
economic life would still allow adherence to the 1.5°C
target, leading to stranded assets and significant de-
struction of capital.37
For these reasons, backloading of mitigation effort
can result in considerably higher aggregate welfare
impacts over time, even without counting the impact
of climate change itself.38 Within current political re-
27 Adam Jaffe, Richard Newell and Robert Stavins, ‘A Tale of Two
Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy’ [2005] 54
Ecol Econ 164.
28 For a detailed definition, see Pankaj Ghemawat and Joan E
Ricart Costa, ‘The Organizational Tension between Static and
Dynamic Efficiency’ [1993] 14:S2 Strat Mgmt J 59.
29 Carolyn Fischer and Richard G Newell, ‘Environmental and
Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation’ [2008] 55 J Envtl
Econ Mgmt. 142; Baran Doda and Samuel L Fankhauser, ‘Energy
Policy and the Power Sector in the Long Run’ (2017) Grantham
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Work-
ing Paper No 276 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp
-content/uploads/2017/09/Working-Paper-276-Doda-Fankhauser
-1.pdf> accessed 5 March 2018.
30 Benjamin Görlach, ‘Emissions Trading in the Climate Policy Mix:
Understanding and Managing Interactions with Other Policy
Instruments’ [2014] 25 Energy & Env 733.
31 Daron Acemoğlu and others, ‘The Environment and Directed
Technical Change’ [2012] 102 Am Econ Rev 131.
32 Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre, ‘Environmental
Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evidence from the
European Carbon Market’ [2016], 98 Rev Econ Stat 173; see
also Margaret R Taylor, ‘Innovation under Cap-and-trade Pro-
grams’ [2012] 109 Proc Nat’l Acad Sci 4804.
33 On the concept of policy durability, see Eric Patashnik, Reforms
at Risk (Princeton University Press 2008).
34 Uncertainty about the future evolution and ambition of carbon
pricing in the European Union, for instance, has contributed to
investment decisions that are incompatible with a deep decar-
bonisation pathway, see William Acworth and others, Emissions
Trading and the Role of a Long Run Carbon Price Signal: Achiev-
ing Cost Effective Emission Reductions under an Emissions Trading
System (International Carbon Action Partnership 2017).
35 Karen C Seto and others, ‘Carbon Lock-In: Types, Causes, and
Policy Implications’ [2016] 41 Ann Rev Env & Resources 425.
36 Alexander Pfeiffer and others, ‘The ‘2°C Capital Stock’ for Elec-
tricity Generation: Committed Cumulative Carbon Emissions from
the Electricity Generation Sector and the Transition to a Green
Economy’ [2016] 179 Appl Energy 1395.
37 A recent report estimates that USD 1.6 trillion in capital expendi-
ture will be at risk by 2025 if the world implements climate
policies consistent with the targets of the Paris Agreement (assum-
ing a 1.75°C scenario), see Andrew Grant, Mind The Gap: The
$1.6 Trillion Energy Transition Risk (Carbon Tracker 2018).
38 Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Guy Meunier and Stéphane Hallegatte,
‘When Starting with the most Expensive Option Makes Sense:
Optimal Timing, Cost and Sectoral Allocation of Abatement
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alities, therefore, the static efficiency which renders
carbon pricing superior to other instruments in the
short run is also its weakness in a longer, dynamic
perspective. Altogether, carbon pricing appears bet-
ter suited for incremental emission cuts at the mar-
gin, not for the systemic transformation required for
achievement of the 1.5°C target. It is premised on no-
tions of marginal cost and benefit, placing it at con-
ceptual odds with an issue of the scale and temporal
sensitivity of climate change.39 By promoting incre-
mental optimisation of existing systems, it may bind
investment and render incumbent practices and tech-
nologies more resilient to change.40 Instead of spear-
heading innovation and systemic transformation,
carbon pricing may thus be most useful where it can
incentivise marginal optimisation in specific con-
texts, such as fuel switching in the electricity sector.41
III. Experiences with Carbon Pricing in
the Real World
While carbon pricing has been amply shown to of-
fer static efficiency for emission reductions at the
margin, there has been little evidence to date that it
can leverage the deep emission cuts required for full
decarbonisation within this century. Leaving aside
complex questions about research methodologies to
discern and measure the effects of carbon pricing
policies amidst other factors affecting emissions,42
the track record of carbon pricing does not document
any examples of abatement in excess of single-digit
percentages. While past observations do not neces-
sarily rule out improved performance of carbon pric-
ing going forward, they still offer an indication of
how carbon pricing fares in the real world. One com-
mon theme across virtually all case studies are polit-
ical constraints that prevent higher price levels, sub-
stantiating the vulnerabilities of carbon pricing de-
scribed in the previous section, and casting doubt on
its suitability as a sole or primary instrument of deep
decarbonisation.
1. Carbon Taxes in the Real World
The World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard has ex-
haustive data on carbon pricing systems implement-
ed around the world, affirming a steady expansion
in the share of global emissions covered by carbon
prices, albeit with significant variation in price lev-
els.43 According to this dashboard, a total of 47 sep-
arate carbon pricing initiatives were in place as of
2018.44 They are found at the national, sub-national,
and supra-national level, and comprise taxes, emis-
sions trading systems, hybrid carbon pricing sys-
tems, and emission crediting mechanisms. A major-
ity of these carbon pricing systems are based on some
form of taxation, which are commonly defined as
‘compulsory, unrequited payments to general gov-
ernment.’45 Several jurisdictions, including Japan
and British Columbia, have imposed uniform, econ-
omy-wide carbon taxes. About as many jurisdictions
have implemented varying carbon taxes on different
sectors and products, for instance Sweden and Mex-
ico.
In many countries, emissions from transport and,
to a lesser extent, from heating and electricity gener-
ation are subject to a fiscal burden in the form of ex-
cise or consumption taxes imposed on fuel sales.
When these taxes are not expressly based on the car-
bon content of the fuels, they are not considered car-
bon taxes strictu sensu, yet because they still increase
the cost of GHG emissions – and thereby contribute
to internalising their environmental externalities –
they are often included in carbon tax assessments,
39 Nicholas Stern, ‘Ethics, Equity and the Economics of Climate
Change. Paper 2: Science and Philosophy’ [2014] 30 Econ Phil
397, 398: ‘Risks on this scale take us far outside the familiar
policy questions and standard, largely marginal, techniques
commonly used by economists.’ Nicholas Stern, ‘Ethics, Equity
and the Economics of Climate Change. Paper 2: Economics and
Politics’ [2014] 30 Econ Phil 445: ‘Issues of this scale and tempo-
ral sensitivity cannot be convincingly represented as the integral
of a collection of marginal changes in a static model or where the
clock is conceptually stopped whilst the tatonnement process
edging towards some optimum takes place.’
40 Howard A Latin, Climate Change Policy Failures: Why Conven-
tional Mitigation Approaches Cannot Succeed (World Scientific
2012).
41 Michael Grubb, Planetary Economics: Energy, Climate Change
and the Three Domains of Sustainable Development (Routledge
2014).
42 For a good discussion of alternative methodologies to ascertain
mitigation effects and distinguish causation from correlation, see
Misato Sato and others, ‘Methods for Evaluating the Performance
of Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2015) Climate Strategies Discus-
sion Paper <http://climatestrategies.org/publication/methods-for
-evaluating-the-performance-of-emission-trading-schemes> ac-
cessed 8 March 2017.
43 See <http://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org> accessed 28
February 2018.
44 World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics, State and Trends of
Carbon Pricing (World Bank 2017).
45 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Revenue Statistics 2017: Tax Revenue Trends in the
OECD (OECD Publishing 2017) 1.
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occasionally under the designation of ‘effective car-
bon rates.’46 Data from the International Energy
Agency (IEA) shows that excise taxes paid by the elec-
tricity sector are substantially lower than those paid
by households, with industry placed in the middle.
A breakdown of excise taxes by fuel shows that road
transportation is taxed most heavily, with median
rates often in the range of 200-400 USD per tCO2e.
By contrast, taxes on coal, fuel oils, and gas used in
industry and power generation are taxed more light-
ly, with the median rate often in the single digits and
in any event below USD 100 per tCO2e.
A survey of excise taxes, carbon taxes, and other
relevant forms of pricing in Member States of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and other major economies finds clear
divergences between real-world carbon prices, on the
one hand, and modelled carbon price projections or
the social cost of carbon on the other.47 In the 41 coun-
tries included in this survey, carbon prices cover on-
ly 40% of emissions, with the remainder of emissions
exempt from a price signal; 90% of emissions sub-
ject to a carbon price face prices below 30 EUR per
tCO2e. Reflecting the foregoing observation, emis-
sion taxes related to road transport fuels are, as a gen-
eral rule, much higher than taxes applied to station-
ary sources.
Although no comprehensive survey has tried to
quantify the mitigation performance of these diverse
carbon taxes and, more broadly, the effective carbon
rates in place around the world, assessments of indi-
vidual jurisdictions tend to identify statistically rele-
vant abatement effects. Generally, however, even
those carbon taxes considered particularly effective
from a mitigation perspective have only been shown
to spur moderate emission reductions, at least rela-
tive to the efforts required for deep decarbonisation
in line with the 1.5°C target.48 Even there, moreover,
the causal role of carbon taxes alongside other cli-
mate policies has been debated, potentially further
detracting from their performance.49
In the transportation sector, where effective car-
bon rates are typically highest – and often well above
current estimates of the social cost of carbon – sta-
tistical data again reflects mostly incremental emis-
sion reductions. An instructive example is Sweden,
which is noteworthy for having implemented the
highest carbon tax at currently USD 163 per tCO2e.
Emissions from the Swedish transport sector, how-
ever, declined only four percent between 1990 – the
year before the carbon tax was introduced – to 2015.50
As importantly, new gasoline and diesel vehicle reg-
istrations in Sweden have grown in recent years,51
locking in continued emissions for a decade or more.
All this should not suggest that carbon taxes have
not limited or reduced emissions compared to a coun-
terfactual scenario. But what the empirical track
record shows is a high willingness to pay for certain
benefits such as individual mobility, and conversely
a price elasticity in key sectors that is insufficient to
guarantee decarbonisation at a rate consistent with
the 1.5°C target, at least in any realistic political sce-
nario.
2. Emissions Trading in the Real World
Emissions trading systems appear to fare somewhat
better than carbon taxes when measured against
their ultimate goal: emissions are declining, often sig-
nificantly. Less clear, however, is whether the reduc-
tions have actually been caused – or are merely cor-
related – with introduction of the emissions trading
system. In the case of the European Union, for in-
stance, decreasing emissions in covered sectors have
been ascribed to several causes other than emissions
trading, including broader economic weakness and
mitigation pressure from complementary policies,
such as programmes to promote renewable energy
and energy efficiency.52 In recent years, moreover,
46 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Effective Carbon Rates: Pricing CO2 through Taxes and
Emissions Trading Systems (OECD Publishing 2016).
47 OECD (n 9).
48 In British Columbia, for instance, which is often portrayed as a
‘textbook example’ of carbon taxation, the carbon tax (currently
at CAD 30 per tCO2e) is only estimated to have reduced emis-
sions between 5% and 15%, see Brian Murray and Nicholas
Rivers, ‘British Columbia’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax: A Re-
view of the Latest ‘Grand Experiment’ in Environmental Policy’
[2015] 86 Energy Pol’y 674.
49 See Ekaterina Rhodes and Mark Jaccard, ‘A Tale of Two Climate
Policies: Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax and
Clean Electricity Standard’ [2013] 39 Can Publ Pol’y S37.
50 Julius Andersson, Cars, Carbon Taxes and CO2 Emissions
(Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environ-
ment, 2017).
51 Trafikanalys, ‘Fordon 2016’ (2017) <http://www.trafa.se/
globalassets/statistik/vagtrafik/fordon/2016/fordon_2016_blad.pdf
> accessed 25 February 2018.
52 Michael Mehling, ‘Between Twilight and Renaissance: Changing
Prospects for the Carbon Market’ [2012] 6 CCLR 277; Endre
Tvinnereim, ‘The Bears are Right: Why Cap-and-trade Yields
Greater Emission Reductions than Expected, and what that Means
for Climate Policy’ [2014] 127 Clim Change 447.
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the European carbon market has proven unable to
prevent new construction of coal-fired power
plants.53
One difference between the two pricing mecha-
nisms relates to their scope and coverage in practice:
emissions trading typically covers large, stationary
installations, whereas taxes are more often aimed at
consumers. Such differences in design can signifi-
cantly affect abatement performance: electricity gen-
erators and heavy industry respond differently to
price signals, and have the requisite capacity and re-
sources for strategic, long-term planning. Also, they
can often substitute technologies, raw inputs, and
processes more easily with clean alternatives than in-
dividual consumers. Occasionally, marginal abate-
ment costs will simply be lower in large emitters, or
emissions might fall due to emissions displacement
into other regions. Known as leakage, such displace-
ment occurs through shifting production, invest-
ment, and energy flows.54
Emissions trading has also proven more suscepti-
ble to uncertainty and interactions with other poli-
cies. Although uncertainty about fundamentals, such
as technology cost, fuel and resource cost, and eco-
nomic cycles, as well as adverse policy interactions
can affect all climate policy making, they have been
shown to effect dramatic impacts in the case of emis-
sions trading,55 translating into price volatility and
what has been euphemistically termed an ‘imbalance
of demand and supply’,56 with prices that are, on av-
erage, much lower than carbon taxes around the
world.
Over a decade of experience with pure emissions
trading systems has shown that the absence of any
price or supply intervention mechanism results in an
untenably short and uncertain planning horizon for
investments in long-lived capital assets such as elec-
tricity generation facilities. New design features, such
as carbon price floors, auction reserve prices, and
market stability reserves, are becoming increasingly
prevalent to avoid the unintended outcomes wit-
nessed in practice, such as increased dispatch of or
new investment in coal-fired generation. Instrument
hybridization therefore marks a logical and perhaps
inevitable evolution of emissions trading.57 Still, as
with individual behaviour, corporate behaviour is not
always predictable: in the emissions trading pilot sys-
tems introduced in several Chinese cities and
provinces starting in 2013, for instance, the largely
state-owned participants failed to respond to market
signals, undermining an indispensable condition for
cost effectiveness of this instrument.58
IV. Instrument Portfolios and the Role
of Regulation
As mentioned earlier, different market failures con-
tribute to anthropogenic climate change, from the
negative externality of carbon emissions to the pos-
itive externalities of innovation spill overs, informa-
tion asymmetries, bounded rationality, and split in-
centives.59 Also, climate policies can pursue objec-
tives other than emissions abatement, such as pro-
moting innovation, inducing structural transforma-
tion, increasing energy security, or building re-
silience to climate change.60 A widely accepted no-
tion in economic theory, the ‘Tinbergen Rule’, states
that each policy objective requires at least one poli-
cy instrument,61 and provides the theoretical justifi-
cation for a variety of policy instruments in an in-
strument portfolio.
Given the theoretical constraints and empirical
track record of carbon pricing described in the pre-
vious sections, it becomes clear that deep decarbon-
53 European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electrici-
ty (ENTSOE), Yearly Statistics and Adequacy Retrospect 2015
(ENTSOE 2017).
54 John Ward and others, ‘Carbon Leakage: Theory, Evidence and
Policy Design’ (2015) Partnership for Market Readiness Technical
Note 11 <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/22785/K8516.pdf> accessed 25 February 2018.
55 Mehling (n 52).
56 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and to the Council: Report on the Functioning of the
European Carbon Market’ COM (2017) 693 final, 23.
57 Georg Grüll and Luca Taschini, ‘Cap-and-Trade Properties Under
Different Hybrid Scheme Designs’ [2011] 61 J Envtl Econ Mgmt
107; Cameron Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or
Both: A Review of Instrument Choice’ [2006] 22 Oxf Rev Econ
Pol’y 226; William A Pizer, ‘Combining Price and Quantity
Controls to Mitigate Global Climate Change’ [2002] 85 J Publ
Econ 409.
58 Anatole Boute and Hao Zhang, ‘The Role of the Market and Tradi-
tional Regulation in Decarbonising China’s Energy Supply’ [2017]
30 J Envt’l L <https://academic.oup.com/jel/advance-article-abstract/
doi/10.1093/jel/eqx028/4644814?redirectedFrom=fulltext>; Clayton
Munnings and others, ‘Assessing the Design of Three Carbon Trad-
ing Pilot Programs in China’ [2016] 96 Energy Pol’y 688.
59 David M Driesen, ‘The Limits of Pricing Carbon’ [2014] 4 Clim L
107.
60 Dieter Helm, ‘Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy’
36 Econ Soc Rev 205, 214.
61 Jan Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy (North Holland
Publishing Co 1952) 37; Leif Johansen, Public Economics (North-
Holland Publishing Co 1965) 12.
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isation within current political realities and stringent
timelines will necessitate reliance on other policy in-
struments. Performance and technology standards,
directed subsidies and price supports, licensing and
planning, information and suasive instruments, and
public investments in infrastructure and innovation
all play useful and important roles alongside carbon
pricing to ensure achievement of the 1.5°C target. Re-
search on these policy alternatives, however, includ-
ing their conditions, impacts, and interactions, has
lagged behind research on carbon pricing. A short
overview of research on portfolios of climate policy
instruments follows in the next sections, along with
a case study on technology phase-out mandates in
the transportation sector.
1. Research on Instrument Portfolios
Research on instrument portfolios for climate policy
mitigation remains a relatively narrow field. Several
studies have affirmed the superiority of instrument
combinations over reliance on individual policies.
Daron Acemoglu and others, for instance, recom-
mend a balance between moderate carbon taxes and
innovation subsidies.62 Christoph Bertram and oth-
ers argue that an instrument portfolio can have few-
er distributional effects and smaller efficiency loss-
es relative to an ‘optimal’ carbon price.63 Similarly,
Jesse Jenkins has favoured a combination of instru-
ments, including incentives for technological inno-
vation, notably through creative use of carbon pric-
ing revenues.64 Such observations have also in-
formed a recent high-level report on carbon pricing,
which expressly acknowledges the importance of
complementary instruments to reduce overall wel-
fare impacts and address market failures for which
carbon pricing would be inefficient.65
Focusing on the political economy of climate pol-
icy, Jonas Meckling and others have acknowledged
that carbon prices are unlikely to reach levels high
enough to induce the deep emission cuts implied by
politically agreed targets.66 Based on their analysis,
targeted support policies with concentrated winners
– such as subsidies for renewable energy deployment
– are more likely to display policy durability, as they
create constituencies supportive of robust climate
policy.67 Opinion surveys have confirmed that such
policy alternatives are also more popular with the
broader public, despite their overall cost.68 Such sup-
port can, in turn, expand the political opportunity
space for higher carbon prices,69 leading some com-
mentators to argue for a sequential approach, in
which the timeline of policy implementation sees car-
bon pricing following other policy instruments.70 Al-
together, distributional concerns are important for
the success or failure of climate policy, calling for ad-
ditional research.71
Instrument portfolios allow combining instru-
ments to harness their respective strengths, but bad
portfolio design can result in policy interactions and
pose considerable challenges to climate policy perfor-
mance.72 Such interactions are particularly likely
where policies pursue more than one objective, or un-
62 Daron Açemoglu and others, ‘The Environment and Directed
Technical Change’ [2012] 102 Am Econ Rev 131.
63 Bertram and others (n 6)
64 Jesse D Jenkins, ‘Political Economy Constraints on Carbon Pricing
Policies: What Are the Implications for Economic Efficiency,
Environmental Efficacy, and Climate Policy Design?’ [2014] 69
Energy Pol’y 467; the substantial impact of strategic revenue
recycling relative to the behavioural effect of the carbon price
itself has been borne out in practice with the U.S. Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, see Paul J Hibbard and others, The
Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on
Nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States: Review of RGGI’s Se-
cond Three-Year Compliance Period (2012-2014) (Analysis Group
2015), and is also key to fostering enduring public support, see
David Amdur, Barry G Rabe and Christopher P Borick, ‘Public
Views on a Carbon Tax Depend on the Proposed Use of Revenue’
[2014] 13 Issues Energy Envtl Pol’y 1.
65 Stiglitz and others (n 1) 37, 47-9.
66 Jonas Meckling and others, ‘Winning Coalitions for Climate
Policy’, [2015] 349 Science 1170, pointing to the example of
climate policy combined with industrial and labour policy under-
lying the growth of the German wind industry.
67 Axel Michaelowa, ‘The German Wind Energy Lobby: How to
Promote Costly Technological Change Successfully’ [2005] 15
Eur Env 192.
68 Jon A Krosnick and Bo MacInnis, ‘Does the American Public
Support Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions?’
[2013] 142 Daedalus 26.
69 Gernot Wagner and others, ‘Energy Policy: Push Renewables to
Spur Carbon Pricing’ [2015] 525 Nature 27; Generally Brian J
Cook, ‘Arenas of Power in Climate Change Policymaking’ [2010]
38 Policy Stud J 465.
70 Jonas Meckling, Thomas Sterner and Gernot Wagner, ‘Policy
Sequencing toward Decarbonization’ [2017] 2 Nat Energy 918;
Michael Pahle and others, What Stands in the Way Becomes the
Way: Sequencing in Climate Policy to Ratchet Up Stringency
Over Time (Resources for the Future 2017).
71 Diana Ürge-Vorsatz and others, ‘Measuring the Co-Benefits of
Climate Change Mitigation’ [2014] 39 Ann Rev Env & Res 549.
72 Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron Hepburn and Jisung Park, ‘Combin-
ing Multiple Climate Policy Instruments: How Not to Do It’
[2010] 1 Clim Ch Econ 209; Carolyn Fischer and Louis Preonas,
‘Combining Policies for Renewable Energy: Is the Whole Less
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dermine each other and necessitate tradeoffs.73 Giv-
en its economic rationale of promoting mitigation at
least cost, carbon pricing is particularly prone to ad-
verse interactions when implemented alongside oth-
er instruments that address the same market failure.
Performance and technology standards, for instance,
can interfere with the ability of carbon pricing to
equalize abatement cost across the economy and
identify the most cost-effective abatement options.74
In the case of emissions trading systems, meanwhile,
where the overall emissions level is determined by
the number of units in circulation, emissions reduc-
tions achieved under other policies can displace emis-
sion units which will then serve to offset emissions
elsewhere in the system, effectively only shifting the
location and timing of emissions under the political-
ly determined limit.75 Instrument portfolios there-
fore require careful design, and deserve greater atten-
tion in climate policy research and analysis.
2. Case Study: Individual Mobility
A particular need for high-cost initial investment can
be found in the transport sector, where decarbonisa-
tion requires both a replacement of the existing vehi-
cle stock and the provision of alternative technologies
and infrastructure. Although the expected economic
life of vehicles is lower than that of power generation
facilities, the natural retirement of aging combustion
engine vehicles constitutes an excellent opportunity to
replace fossil with low carbon capital stock at renewal.
As mentioned in an earlier section, however, price
signals are not always effective in the transport sec-
tor, given low price elasticities and a high willingness
to pay for individual mobility. Research has shown
that vehicle choice depends less on price signals than
on a variety of preferences related to vehicle perfor-
mance, size, familiarity, and range.76 Entering infor-
mation on customer preference heterogeneity into
integrated assessment models (IAMs) has been
shown to produce results where electric vehicle pen-
etration is delayed by several decades, increasing
emissions relative to the scenario where only price
matters.77 Performance standards for new invest-
ments offer an alternative policy approach, yet their
widespread adoption has not only incurred substan-
tial cost,78 but also failed to curb transport emissions
in line with mandated decarbonisation targets.
Political economy constraints are, again, a central
factor in the observed intractability of emission re-
ductions in this sector, with a limited number of high-
ly organized and vocal actors on the part of both ve-
hicle manufacturers and consumers capturing the
political debate. Faced with the need to achieve sub-
stantial emission reductions in the near term while
also ensuring that new capital stock in the transport
sector is channelled towards technologies and infra-
structure with zero direct emissions, policy makers
are increasingly turning to another policy category:
technology mandates.
Accordingly, several countries have recently pro-
posed future bans on the sale of new vehicles with
internal combustion engines. For instance, in July
2017, the French government announced an inten-
tion to phase out the sale of new diesel- and gasoline-
fuelled cars by 2040, and the city of Paris is even con-
templating an earlier ban on existing conventional
vehicles by 2030. Similar statements have been made
by China, India, Norway, and the United Kingdom.79
73 William A Knudson, ‘The Environment, Energy, and the Tinbergen
Rule’ [2009] 29 Bullet Sci Tech Soc 308, 309-311.
74 If the carbon price is higher than the marginal abatement cost
under such complementary policies, it becomes redundant,
whereas if it is lower, the simultaneous application of directed
technology mandates will curtail the compliance flexibility of
emitters and increase the cost of achieving the same environmen-
tal outcome, see IPCC (: Reference source not found) 1182.
75 Dallas Burtraw and William Shobe, State and Local Climate
Policy under a National Emissions Floor (Resources for the Future
2009); Lawrence H Goulder and Robert N Stavins, ‘Challenges
from State-Federal Interactions in US Climate Change Policy’
[2011] 101 Am Econ Rev 253; additionally, the increase in unit
supply will, ceteres paribus, exert downward pressure on unit
prices until all units in circulation are again demanded, thereby
weakening the price signal in the market, see Lawrence H Goul-
der and Andrew Schein, ‘Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A
Critical Review’ [2013] 4 Clim Ch Econ 1, 16.
76 See, for instance, James Archsmith and others, ‘Attribute Substitu-
tion in Household Vehicle Portfolios’ (2017) NBER Working
Paper No 23856 <https://www.nber.org/papers/w23856> ac-
cessed 5 March 2018.
77 David L McCollum and others, ‘Improving the Behavioral Realism
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Consumers’ Vehicle Choices’ [2017] 55 Transp Res Pt D: Trans &
Env 322.
78 Academic analysis has widely concluded that fuel economy and
emissions standards are costly relative to the achieved emission
reductions, see Valerie J Karplus and Sergey Paltsev, ‘Proposed
Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards in the United States for 2017 to
2025: Impacts on the Economy, Energy, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions’ [2012] 2287 Transp Res Record 132.
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Vehicle manufacturers are already responding, for
instance with the announcement by Volvo that it will
phase out production of purely fossil-fuelled cars by
2019. Accompanying such phase out efforts are man-
dates for electric vehicle penetration by specified
deadlines, incentive and transition assistance pro-
grammes, as well as public investments in charging
infrastructure. Deep decarbonization of the trans-
port sector passenger cars does not appear likely to
be primarily tax-driven in practice, although taxes
play a part in making some types of vehicles more
attractive than others. Rather, regulations, standards,
and public infrastructure are the principal instru-
ments.
This surge in blunt technology mandates begs im-
portant questions about the political economy of al-
ternative climate policy instruments, and their role
in an instrument portfolio for deep decarbonisation
within stringent timelines. Despite their document-
ed inferiority in terms of static cost-effectiveness,80
for instance, regulatory policies, when implemented
alongside carbon pricing, have been shown to have
a reliable abatement effect.81 Politically, they are aid-
ed by the fact that costs of their achievement – both
social and private – are less visible than with carbon
pricing policies. Conceptually, their promise of a
guaranteed outcome make them particularly attrac-
tive in cases where achievement of binding policy
objectives within specified timelines takes prece-
dence over static cost-effectiveness. Pressure to adopt
dramatic measures after a sequence of visible policy
failures are also what is prompting consideration of
phase out mandates in the transport and electricity
sectors. But as past experience with phase out poli-
cies shows, hasty or uncoordinated action can have
judicial repercussions and result in stranded assets,82
justifying further research to understand the condi-
tions and effects of carbon pricing and alternative
climate policy instruments in instrument portfolios.
3. A Research Agenda for Instrument
Portfolios
More research is needed on the effects of portfolio
approaches that combine various instruments, in-
cluding the contributions of each constituent policy.
An example of such a study is seen in the case of
British Columbia, where a comparison of the widely
lauded carbon tax and a clean electricity standard
adopted simultaneously in the province showed that
the latter reduced 4 to 6 times more emissions than
the former, enjoying greater public acceptance, but
also incurring higher average abatement costs than
the carbon tax.83 While various instruments may
spur emission reductions in the same sector, their ef-
fects can be shown to work along different dimen-
sions, with research subsidies, for instance, promot-
ing development and uptake of specific technologies
over the long term, while carbon pricing tends to
leverage abatement much more broadly and in the
shorter term.84
Political economy constraints and unforeseen pol-
icy interactions have fundamental implications for
the viability and performance of climate policy in-
strument portfolios. As the foregoing example of
technology phase out mandates shows, knowledge
gaps and misplaced faith in theoretically optimal in-
struments can result in costly policy corrections. Be-
sides the conventional vehicle phase out initiatives
mentioned in the previous section, for instance, a
number of countries are also introducing policies to
limit or phase out coal use in electricity generation,85
including the United Kingdom, which already has
one of the highest carbon prices for electricity gen-
erators due to its domestic carbon floor price. But as
that last example also shows, uncoordinated unilat-
eral action can have unintended consequences, in
this case by displacing emission allowances that have
become available for continued emissions in other
parts of Europe.
Preventing carbon lock-in through long-lived cap-
ital assets may necessitate blunt policies such phase
80 Fischer and Newell (n 28).
81 Olivier Gloaguen and Emilie Alberola, ‘Assessing the Factors
Behind CO2 Emissions Changes over the Phases 1 and 2 of the
EU ETS: An Econometric Analysis’ (2013) CDC Climate Research
Working Paper No 2013-15 <http://www.cdcclimat.com/IMG/pdf/
13-10_cdc_climat_r_wp_13-15_assessing_the_factors_behing
_co2_emissions_changes.pdf> accessed 8 March 2018; Rhodes
and Jaccard (n 48).
82 Karoline S Rogge and Phil Johnstone, ‘Exploring the Role of
Phase-out Policies for Low-carbon Energy Transitions: The Case of
the German Energiewende’ [2017] 33 Energy Res Soc Sci 128.
83 Rhodes and Jaccard (n 48).
84 For an example related to carbon capture and storage, see
William Blyth and others, ‘Policy Interactions, Risk and Price
Formation in Carbon Markets’ [2009] 37 Energy Pol’y 5192.
85 See the recent pledge by over 20 countries to end coal use by
2030, Powering Past Coal Alliance, ‘Declaration’ (16 November
2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/660041/powering-past-coal-alliance.pdf>
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outs mandates for achievement of deep decarbonisa-
tion,86 yet research into the design, effects and inter-
actions of such policies has lagged far behind the
study of carbon pricing. As a result, policymakers
may lack the information needed to apply these in-
struments in a way that avoids unnecessary cost and
other detrimental effects. Additional research on the
different effects of various mitigation instruments in
an instrument portfolio is therefore needed.
V. Outlook
For all its beneficial effects, a price on carbon does
not guarantee that emitting activities will cease with-
in committed timelines of deep decarbonisation. We
have therefore argued that more attention needs to
be directed toward climate change mitigation instru-
ments other than those based on pricing carbon emis-
sions, including regulatory approaches such as tech-
nology mandates and phase out policies. Such atten-
tion needs to come from policymakers and re-
searchers alike. Otherwise, reliance on carbon pric-
ing alone may lead to substantial sunk costs in fos-
sil-bound infrastructure, due to the numerous mar-
ket failures and particularly onerous political econo-
my constraints facing any attempt to impose suffi-
ciently high prices on carbon emissions.
Altogether, non-price instruments should be
pulled out from subordinate compartments in the
mitigation toolbox, and be presented not as ‘second
best’ or ‘auxiliary’ policies, but rather as integral parts
of a portfolio. Because of their stigma as suboptimal
policy approaches, these instruments may not re-
ceive the attention they deserve in a process of delib-
erate, strategic policy making, contributing to abrupt
and costly policy corrections down the line as sup-
posedly ‘first best’ instruments underperform or are
finally proven to lack political feasibility. With cur-
rent carbon prices mostly lingering at modest levels
and with patchy coverage, their role may have to be
redefined to that of a backstop measure, leveraging
their ability to curb emissions from existing capital
stock and, in particular, to incentivise abatement in
areas that other instruments are unable to reach. But
to achieve deep decarbonisation in line with the 1.5°C
target, such other instruments will be needed, includ-
ing regulation.
86 Frank W Geels and others, ‘Sociotechnical Transitions for Deep
Decarbonization’ [2017] 357 Science 1242.
